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This article addresses two issues: the African-
American response to United States involvement in the
1990-91 Persian Gulf war and interrelated factors
explaining the nature of that response. Despite the
historical symbolism associated with African-American
participation and disproportionate representation in the
military, African Americans composed the most
consistently identifiable strata either opposed to or
suspicious of the deployment of U.S. troops and military
equipment in the Gulf. The pattern of African-American
response to the Gulf War is remarkably similar to its
underlying reactions to military conflicts taking place in
the recent past, including the Vietnam War and Laos
invasion of the 1960s and 1970s. The weight of the
evidence suggests African-American public opinion
during the Gulf War was not simply part and parcel of a
growing national isolationism. Rather, it reflects African
America's level of political dissent, tolerance, and anti-
imperialism.
The African-American Response to United
States Involvement in the Persian Gulf Crisis
When the Bush administration deployed the first U.S.
troops and equipment to Saudi Arabia on August 8, 1990,
the weight of history gave it every reason to assume that
the public would overwhelmingly support its response to
Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. If the Gulf War ended quickly
with relatively few American casualties, the Bush
administration hoped it would be rewarded by a sorely
needed increase in its public approval rating, possibly one
strong enough to decisively influence the upcoming
elections. Since the end of World War II, the pattern of
Americans' response to U.S. military involvement is one
of sustained support in the early- to mid-stages of the
conflict. However, as the toll of the combat dead rises and
domestic socioeconomic hardship associated with the war
appears to be irremediable, gradual doubt over the
wisdom of the government's action and frustration replace
optimism and exuberant loyalty. Finally, with failure to
quickly resolve the conflict, the plurality of public opinion
registers high disapproval and pessimism with both
military involvement and the president in power.
Using examples over a forty-year period, from 1950 to
1990, the above observation sheds light on the pattern of
majority-response to foreign military involvement and its
transitory nature. The hysteria surrounding the fear of
communism, blind loyalty to the publicly stated goals of
U.S. foreign policy, and national bravado combined to
give U.S. involvement in Korea an approval rating of 65
percent by August 1950 with onl) 20 paced certain that
it was a mistake-.
By 1951, however, onl) 18 perceni believed the
American presence in Korea was not a mistake whilf
percent believed it was. During the Eisenhowei and
Kennedy years. Americans did not seem to be aware ol
the gradual increase in military presence in South
Vietnam; by 1965. support for Lyndon Johnson's plans to
intervene in South Vietnam reached roughly 65 percent
with a two-to-one margin of support lor his decisions
From 1966 to early 1967. less than 40 percent of those
polled characterized U.S. intervention as a mistake.
although 37 percent disapproved of Johnson's
management and 41 percent approved. 1 By April 1968.
the public's wariness with sustained yet murky signs of
victory became evident. After the Tet offensive and the
Pueblo incident, approval of the U.S. presence in Vietnam
dropped to 35 percent. On November 3, 1969. Richard
Nixon called for the "Vietnamization" of the war;
although 55 percent of the public described itself as
"doves" and only 31 percent as "hawks," he received
generally high approval (67 percent) and conduct of the
war (64 percent) ratings. After the invasion of Laos.
Nixon suffered a 7 percent decline in approval with the
majority now disapproving of his handling of the war. By
1971, 61 percent of the public described the entanglement
of U.S. troops in Vietnam as a mistake.
The response to Gerald Ford's decision in the
Mayaguez incident and Jimmy Carter's handling of the
takeover of the U.S. embassy in Teheran and Soviet
invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 followed the pattern of
first overwhelming and later waning support for foreign
military action. Ronald Reagan's reaction to the October
1983 bombing of the U.S. embassy, which resulted in the
death of 241 U.S. citizens, is perhaps one model of how
the government might override and benefit from the
transient nature of public support for armed conflict.
Three days after the bombing and before the public
reaction could be recorded, Reagan announced the
invasion of Grenada. The victory occurred swiftly and
without significant domestic hardship. Conflict analysis
could be propagandized to favor the government in its
management of international affairs during this period.
Reagan's approval rating for the period was a resounding
59 percent. And last, the approval rating of George Bush's
order to invade Panama in 1989 reached 80 percent and
influenced the increase in the approval rating for his
overall Central American policy (66 percent). However,
by 1990, the rising cost of the war and problems occurring
in the trial against Manuel Noriega returned his Central
American approval ratings back to 42 percent.
Three days after Iraq invaded Kuwait, the majority of
U.S. public opinion expressed limited support for U.S.
actions conveying opposition to the invasion.
4 Under
specific conditions—if U.S. citizens became hostages of
Iraq, for example, or if Iraq invaded Saudi Arabia—those
individuals polled said they would advise direct military
intervention. The majority of those polled also called for
economic sanctions against Iraq and if a gasoline shortage
27
were to result from Iraq's actions, they would recommend
a military response. The fact that two-thirds of the public
viewed the war as inevitable suggests that, regardless of
the conditions, the public was preparing itself for direct
military involvement.
When the answers are disaggregated by race, a specific
racial division of opinion appears to have existed from the
very beginning of the conflict between Iraq and Kuwait.
When asked if they favored (f) or opposed (o) direct U.S.
military involvement against Iraq, the percentage of
answers supplied by whites (f:23; o:69) and blacks (f:23;
o:70) were similar as of August 4. When asked if Iraq
invaded Saudi Arabia as well as Kuwait, slight differences
slowly emerged in the answers of whites (f:61; o:25) and
blacks (f:57; o:27). An even more detailed set of
questions revealed a decided racial difference of opinion
(see Table 1). First, African-American response to the
administration's policies did not follow the overall
national pattern of staggering, clear-cut support. Second,
when compared to whites, blacks were far more reticent
to sanction any form of U.S. aggressive response.
In short, while Americans as a whole continued to
approve of some form of action, more than any other
racial group, African Americans recorded disfavor with
U.S. military policy during the early stages of war.
By November 1990, the difference in public opinion
between the races expanded significantly. Nationally, 65
percent of the citizenry supported the initial
announcement of troops being deployed to the Gulf as a
means of blocking an anticipated Iraqi assault against
Saudi Arabia. 5 Yet, only 47 percent approved of sending
another round of troops, which was upwards of 150,000
(see Table 3). Two questions measuring reaction to troop
build-up and the use of war as the primary tool for
conflict resolution confirmed that the vast majority of
blacks polled—at least 70 percent—very strongly
opposed U.S. military decisions strengthening the
likelihood of direct, retaliatory action against Iraq. One
month later, an ambivalent national public had evolved
with approval for initial U.S. troop assembling but no
consensus on the next steps. 6 For 45 percent of the public,
the issues arising from roughly 120 days in the Gulf did
Table 1: Possible U.S. Responses to Iraq i Invasion of Kuwait
Question: Would you favor or oppose the following actions the U.S . has taken or could take? (answer in %)
Freeze Kuwaiti Assets Ban Iraqi Imports U.S. Navy to Gulf
Favor Oppose No Op. Favor Oppose No Op. Favor Oppose No Op.




White 83 9 8 74 16 10 71 20 9
Black 67 17 16 55 25 20 45 39 16
Other 68 21 11 63 24 13 62 27 11
Bomb Military Targets Send U.S. ground troops Allied Oil Boycott
Favor Oppose No Op. Favor Oppose No Op. Favor Oppose No Op.
National 31 57 12 32 56 12 76 13 11
Race
White 33 55 12 32 56 12 79 11 10
Black 27 63 10 28 61 11 59 23 18
Other 25 71 4 47 44 9 70 17 13
Source: The Gallup Poll Monthly, August 1990, 4-5 Note: "No Op" = no opinion.
Following earlier response patterns, after Bush
deployed troops and equipment on August 8, both whites
and blacks registered a higher approval rating of the
government's handling of Gulf-related issues (see Table
2). However, blacks progressively revealed more doubt or
displeasure with heightened U.S. military action than did
the nation as a whole. While Bush's ratings points
(approval, disapproval) improved among whites (29
percent, -5 percent) questioned from August 3-4 to
August 9-12, black support for his handling of the crisis
increased by only 21 points while dissatisfaction
increased 7 points. Although African Americans'
approval ratings never fell to the August 3-4 level,
disapproval of his management of the crisis steadily rose.
not merit a U.S. declaration of war; they did for 47
percent. With the exception of blacks, there was an almost
equal amount of ambiguity and very little consensus
among the races. Of those polled, 49 percent of whites
found that the situation was worth a war, while 42 did not;
45 percent of the races identified as "other" advocated
war and 51 opposed it. For blacks, who showed the lowest
support for war and the highest resistance to it, the
percentages were 32 and 63, respectively. By early
December, Saddam Hussein began to hint that he might
authorize the release of foreign hostages, which he failed
to do in the weeks to come. Partly in response to
Hussein's behavior and to the media campaigns of the
Bush administration, public opinion swung more in favor
28
of the decisions of the White House by mid-December. In
keeping with what was by now an established, racially
based opinion discontinuity, while the national average
was 63 percent approving and 30 percent disapproving,
black response was 34 and 59 percent, respectively.
An opinion poll conducted between December 6 and 9
clarified the basis of African-American disapproval with
the course of action in the Gulf. 7 Of four possible actions
for the nation, 69 percent of the African Americans asked
sought a nonmilitary resolution to the Gulf crisis, 19
African-American institutions, the activities of black
elected officials and national organizations reveal a degree
of opposition to official U.S. policy in the Gull crisis. In
the case of congressional debates on the issue of U.S.
involvement in the Gulf, prior to direct military
intervention, critics effectively raised a number ol issues
against U.S. policy. Once the United States initiated the
bombing of Iraq, however, many critics felt compelled to
cease their vocal opposition. Surprisingly, to some
observers, a decisive number of black congressional
Table 2: Changes in Bush's Middle East Approval During August
Question: Do you approve or disapprove of the way George Bush is handling this current situation in the Middle East



































percent favored withdrawal and 50 percent were for
sanctions—only 28 percent wanted war. Whites were split
(49 percent and 48 percent) between a nonmilitary
reaction and war; 57 percent of other races favored
peaceful means with only 39 percent ready to use force.
Almost six weeks after this survey, the United States led a
high-tech allied force against Iraq, televised
internationally.
The results of these polls did not surprise too many
African Americans. As several commentators in
Washington, D.C., and Boston, Massachusetts, observed
after the resolution of the immediate crisis in the Gulf,
during the media blitz of the war, almost all that one could
hear in black-owned establishments—barber shops,
churches, restaurants, and cleaners—was criticism of the
official policy in the Gulf and expressions of sorrow that
lives on both sides would be lost. The vigorous debates
waged in the historically black colleges—particularly
those in the Clark Atlanta University Complex—and
campus demonstrations were equally informative. The
bluster and almost hysterical demand for military
retribution against Iraq that characterized the media
coverage of public opinion was simply not a consistently
recognizable position in the black community. This is
even more remarkable given that many African
Americans realized their sons and daughters would
comprise a sizeable contingent in the U.S. military in the
Middle East and also might have clearly doubted the
appropriateness of Iraq's invasion.
In addition to discussions in local neighborhoods and
members did not succumb to the notion, "when at war,
loyalty to the flag." The oppositional consistency of
African-American representatives in the Congress and the
waning of their colleagues' critical attacks against the
policy is instructive. Although the majority of blacks in
Congress are active in the Democratic party and loyal to
the party line, many of them participated in antiwar
rallies. They became some of the most outspoken critics
of U.S. policy, even after the House of Representatives
(250 to 183) and the Senate (52 to 47) voted in favor of
the White House policy. 8 Included among these outspoken
members of Congress were Ron Dellums (California),
John Lewis (Georgia), Charles Rangel (New York), John
Conyers (Michigan), and Cardiss Collins (Illinois).
There were two major antiwar groups, the National
Coalition to Stop U.S. Intervention in the Middle East and
the National Campaign for Peace in the Middle East. The
former refused to denounce the Iraqi invasion, opposed
sanctions against Iraq, and included in its organizational
membership the Palestine Solidarity Committee. It was led
by Dick Gregory and former U.S. Attorney General
Ramsey Clark. The latter group, representing mainstream
antiwar groups, denounced the invasion and supported the
United Nations sanctions against Iraq. Of the two groups,
black veterans committees formed to oppose the war,
community development groups, and students
orchestrating demonstrations on historically black college
campuses were more prone to affiliate with the National
Coalition. In addition, as the immensity of the bombings
became increasingly evident, national black leaders,
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including Joseph Lowery of the Southern Christian
Leadership Conference and Ben Chavis met with the aim
of demanding an immediate cease-fire and reevaluation of
the agenda of the American-led forces. More than fifty
leaders attended the last such meeting in New York, a few
days before Iraq met the stipulations of the United Nations
resolution on the removal of its military from Kuwait.
What about African-American opinion after Baghdad
agreed to the terms outlined by George Bush and the
United Nations and the return home of most of the U.S.
troops? The approximate number of U.S. soldiers deployed
in the Persian Gulf was at least 250,000 between August
1990 and July 1992. The death toll amounted to 268, of
which 158 died in combat, and the number of wounded
reached 458 men and women. Following the national
public opinion pattern described previously, a war or any
form of military conflict generating a low death toll in
combat and implemented swiftly would garner
widespread support. Yet, as the racial opinion dichotomy
has evolved since the views of African Americans and
other races have been taken into consideration, African
Americans are far more suspicious of and less likely to
fall in line with publicly stated U.S. foreign military
policy. True to form, almost six weeks after the cease-fire
declared on April 6, 1991, when asked if the war in the
Persian Gulf was worth it, the national pattern and racial
configuration remained constant (see Table 4).
Based on media coverage, it is easy to surmise that
African Americans had little to say about the presence of the
United States in the Persian Gulf. The exception would have
Table 3: Public Opinion Regarding Troop Buildup and Going to War
Question: Do you approve or disapprove of the President's decision to send an
additional 150,000 troops to the Middle East? (answers in %)
Approve Buildup?
Approve Disapprove No Op.
National 47 46 7
Race
White 51 42 7
Black 20 78 2







Source: The Gallup Poll Monthly, November 1990, 16.
been the ever-present media interview of a person who
directly or indirectly knew a black man or woman stationed
in the Gulf. In the first four demonstrations in Boston, for
example, African Americans comprised less than 15 percent
of the marchers. In New Orleans, black participation in
antiwar marches amounted to less than 20 percent. An
examination of the racial composition of sit-ins and mass
civil disobedience activities would reveal similar, if not
lower, figures. In the final analysis, one might conclude that
African America did not respond. Yet, the consistency of
public opinion polls, the activities of African-American
leaders and organizations, and the level of doubt voiced by
blacks in their communities speak for themselves.
Political Tolerance and Anti-imperialism
as Factors Influencing African-American
Response to the Gulf War
Unraveling the complexity of the relationship between
African Americans and the military reveals that the
objective of equal opportunity in the military and overall
full citizenship between the 1700s and 1960 and
disproportionate representation in the military from 1965
to 1992 do not fully define the parameters of African
America's world view. Although not a part of an historical
viewpoint that is emphasized today, it is clear that while
some African Americans fought bravely as Buffalo
Soldiers on behalf of the state, a smaller minority
physically opposed the government by participating in
wars, for example, on the side of the Indians during the
Seminole Wars and Indian campaigns, and as militants
during the Spanish-American War. Many more opposed
U.S. participation in World War II and the Vietnam War.
Questioning state propaganda, therefore, is not without
historical basis. If there were no such basis for dissent
and suspicion stemming from racial oppression,
disproportionate representation in the military, and fear of
appearing to be disloyal to the nation, African Americans
might be compelled to be less independent in their
analyses.
A brief review of public opinion associated with major
military conflicts in the 1960s and 1970s emphasizes
strong, contemporary threads of
critical thinking which in their
appearance are decidedly anti-
imperialist within the context of
U.S. political culture. From
1960 to 1975, even as citizens
labeled the U.S. involvement in
Vietnam a blunder, they could
neither pardon draft resisters
nor approve of complete
withdrawal. Racial breakdown
demonstrates a specific pattern
to this ambiguity, with blacks
disassociated from positions
suggesting strident levels of
unwillingness to condemn
government policy.
In the early 1970s, the
majority of citizens believed it was a mistake for the nation
to become involved in Vietnam with black opinion
fluctuating between 58 and 71 percent and white opinion
in the 50 to 59 percent range. 9 Admitting the mistake,
however, did not necessarily mean that Americans were
willing to condone draft evasion, with which they
continued to find fault during the Vietnam War and even a
year after the signing of the peace accord. In May 1970,
Americans were asked to determine the penalty for draft
evaders. At this time, the percentage of black casualties











that far too many of them were assigned to frontline
combat. Yet, they were decidedly reluctant to advise the
harshest possible punishment against draft resisters and
were almost evenly divided on sending them to Vietnam in
a noncombat capacity or applying no penalty at all. White
public opinion, on the other hand, strongly advised some
form of punishment with preference for noncombat duty in
Vietnam.
Four years later, a majority of Americans opposed
unconditional amnesty, although only 8 percent
recommended imprisonment or fines. Both whites (63
percent) and blacks (72 percent) interpreted opposition to
the draft as being based on moral objections, as opposed
to a total rejection of the nation. 10 While 50 percent of
blacks would have allowed draft resisters to return to the
United States without punishment and 36 percent would
not, the majority of whites (62 to 31 percent) favored
some form of castigation upon return.
In terms of deploying either troops or arms and
materials in military conflicts, Americans were more
likely to agree to the latter but with opinion split on
withdrawal." The decision appears to have been based on
concern for the lives of U.S. troops. A closer inspection
reveals that blacks cautioned against deployment of troops
in Cambodia and Laos and, in the case of Vietnam,
supported withdrawal. African Americans consistently
registered reluctance to send U.S. troops (76 percent) and
equipment (55 percent) to Cambodia in 1970 with
lukewarm support for the deployment of soldiers (13
percent) and arms (24 percent). While national and white
opinions opposed increased troop involvement (59
percent), they favored supplying arms and materials to
Cambodia (55 percent to 33 percent, respectively).
By March 1971, Americans viewed the invasion of
Laos as a measure destined to extend the Vietnam War
and therefore did not support Nixon's plan to place
barricades along the Ho Chi Minh Trail as a way of
shoring up South Vietnam. While the national consensus
to return troops by the end of 1971 was a resoundingly
clear 71 percent with 21 percent opposed, black support
for withdrawal reached 81 percent with 12 percent
against.
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More than twenty years after the Vietnam War, blacks
and whites still disagree on significant issues, although
the gap is closing with both holding on to the view that
the United States erred in its decision to enter the war in
Vietnam and questioning the long-term, positive
consequences of the war. In terms of opinions on war and
deterrence, neither whites nor blacks have arrived at
internal consensus over the use of war as a way of
resolving conflict. The wider implications of these
differences in opinion shown in Table 5 is that in the
future, when compared to whites, blacks will most
probably not easily and immediately accept the
government's Communist scare argument as an
explanation for involving the U.S. military in foreign
wars. If military involvement does occur, blacks are more
likely than whites to continue to support early withdrawal.
Explanations of opinion all too frequently and easily
assert that political partisanship is the overarching
explanatory variable, which conveniently allows verj
comfortable labeling of responses on the basis of "hawks"
and "doves," liberals and conservati\es Indeed, in the
1960s and in 1992, this was assuredly the case. Toda) it is
fashionable to say that demands tor concentrating on
domestic rather than foreign affairs are indicative of a
"return" to isolationism. Certainly, the vast majority ol
Americans demand that the government attend to
domestic affairs. After all. few would argue against the
assertion that long-term, failed state policies are the
foundation of the nation's immediate crises. Those
African Americans who consistently supported U.S.
involvement in the Gulf most definitely realized that
protecting the nation's vital interest at a cost of well over
$2 million exacerbated already tight budgetary
Table 4: Persian Gulf: Was It Worth It?
Question: All in all, was the current situation in the
Mideast worth going to war over, or not.
(answer in %)
Yes No No opinion
National 72 23 5
Race
White 74 21 5
Black 46 48 6
Other 68 26 6
Source: The Gallup Poll Monthly, June 1991, 50.
constraints. They were undoubtedly cognizant of the
innumerable problems faced by their own communities
and the failure of the government to address them
adequately. For that reason, the vast majority of African
Americans are urgently seeking some form of redress.
African Americans are not simply a sizeable percentage
of citizens clamoring for resolution of socioeconomic
problems because of being "especially hard hit by the
recessionary times." 11 Were redress of domestic socio-
economic problems the only pressing concerns of African
Americans, 64 percent of them would not have veered
from the thrust of so-called isolationism today. That 64
percent comprises the dominant force for ending anti-
imperialist, military excursions abroad and is acting within
the tradition of political dissent challenging the prevailing
national ideological view. Unlike others, whatever false
consciousness regarding national loyalty this group
possesses, in times of war and peace, it does not allow
itself to be barred from questioning the rationale behind
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Table 5: Mistakes in Vietnam
Questions: Looking back, do you think the U.S. made a mistake sending troops to
fight in Vietnam? Some people say that the U.S. should have cut its losses by
accepting a negotiated withdrawal from Vietnam much earlier. Others say the U.S.
should have made an even greater military effort to try to win a victory there. Which
comes closest to your view? (%)
No Op.










Source: The Gallup Poll Monthly, May 1990, 16.
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